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Abstract
Solar radiation management (SRM) technologies are considered one of the likeliest
forms of geoengineering. If developed, a future generation could deploy them to limit the
damages caused by the atmospheric carbon stock inherited from the current generation,
despite their negative side effects. Should the current generation develop these geoengi-
neering capabilities for a future generation? And how would a decision to develop SRM
impact on the current generation’s abatement efforts? Natural scientists, ethicists, and
other scholars argue that future generations could be more sanguine about the side effects
of SRM deployment than the current generation. In this paper, we add economic rigor
to this important debate on the intergenerational transfer of technological capabilities
and pollution stocks. We identify three conjectures that constitute potentially rational
courses of action for current society, including a ban on the development of SRM. How-
ever, the same premises that underpin these conjectures also allow for a novel possibility:
If the development of SRM capabilities is sufficiently cheap, the current generation may
for reasons of intergenerational strategy decide not just to develop SRM technologies, but
also to abate more than in the absence of SRM.
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1 Introduction
The economics of climate change have been emphasizing for a long time that concerns for
intergenerational equity imply that the current generation needs to reduce its greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. Such a reduction will benefit future generations by decreasing the damages
they are expected to suffer as a result of climate change (e.g. Stern 2006). Consequently, a
central concern of the literature on optimal climate policy is to determine the optimal scale of
abatement efforts vis-a`-vis the business-as-usual scenario and thus to determine the optimal
intertemporal trajectory of mitigation (Stern 2006; Nordhaus 2007; Tol 2001).
Recent developments have started to challenge the almost exclusive role of emissions
reductions in climate policy. Apart from progress on the economics of adaptation to climate
change (Agrawala and Fankhauser 2008), there is growing awareness among economists of
the increasing plausibility of so-called “climate engineering” (CE). This term is a shorthand
for deliberate large-scale interventions in the Earth’s climate system with the aim of limiting
the damages of excessive atmospheric carbon stocks (Keith 2000). A variety of approaches
run under the heading of “climate engineering” or “geoengineering”. Most of the attention
focuses—due to feasibility, effectiveness, and cost—on solar radiation management (SRM)
technologies. These technologies enable an increase in the Earth’s albedo with respect to
solar radiation, e.g. by the dispersal of reflective aerosols in the stratosphere. This allows
the Earth to tolerate higher atmospheric carbon stocks while keeping global mean surface
temperatures within acceptable bounds. Merely a theoretical possibility decades ago (Fleming
2010), it is now considered feasible that an ambitious R&D program could deliver effective
SRM technologies within a few decades (Ridgwell et al. 2012).
A setting in which GHG emissions reductions are not the only option for addressing
climate change damages, but compete with or are complemented by investment in geoengi-
neering capabilities raises an entirely new set of questions. Some early assessments of climate
engineering conclude that a future generation with access to such technologies would be able
to handle the damages associated with stock pollutants at a surprisingly low direct variable
cost (Klepper and Rickels 2012; Barrett 2008). However, these technologies are not under-
stood to be “magic bullets”. The current consensus is that SRM interventions will involve
significant indirect costs through side effects, such as changes in precipitation patterns, and
that these side effects will themselves raise issues of how benefits and costs are distributed
(Klepper and Rickels 2012; Moreno-Cruz and Keith 2012; Ricke et. al. 2010). As a result, a
decision-maker will have to carefully weigh the social benefits of avoided carbon damages and
the social costs of SRM-induced side effects when making a decision on the deployment of
geoengineering measures. Some papers have started to establish the conditions under which
the deployment of SRM may or may not be meaningful (Bickel and Agrawal 2012; Goes et
al. 2011; Moreno-Cruz and Keith 2012), to consider the impacts of a geoengineering capa-
bility on international negotiations (Barrett 2008; Moreno-Cruz 2010) and how to regulate
deployment (Barrett 2008; Victor 2008).
The starting point of this paper is the observation that at the present time, the tech-
nological capabilities for a deployable SRM system do not exist. These capabilities would
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have to be created at a cost, and the costs of developing these capabilities are considered
substantial (Klepper and Rickels 2012). It would fall to the current generation to devote
some of its resources to investment into a R&D program that would make these capabilities
available, perhaps 30 years from now, to a future generation (Schelling 1996). But is it a
rational course of action for the current generation to develop these capabilities for a future
generation that can then decide on its use? And how would a decision to develop such SRM
capabilities impact on abatement efforts?
Despite agreement on the basic premises of the decision problem, the current literature
offers at least five different conjectures regarding the rational course of action. One conjecture,
termed “arming the future” argues in favor of SRM R&D since the technology would act as
some type of insurance in the event that the sensitivity of the climate system with respect
to the carbon stock turns out to be high (Moreno-Cruz and Keith 2012). This rationale of
SRM R&D has been advanced by a number of commentators (Gardiner 2010; Schneider 1996
cited in Gardiner 2011, p.9) and enjoys considerable support. Some have even gone so far as
to claim that, since SRM is an imperfect substitute for emissions abatement, a positive SRM
R&D decision will not affect GHG emissions abatement (Bunzl 2009). This conjecture, which
we dub “abatement invariance”, contrasts with a third conjecture, namely that investment
in SRM R&D detracts from mitigation and will lead to less abatement effort (Keith 2010,
Shepherd 2009). This possibility of a reduction in mitigation effort by the current generation
has been characterized as a manifestation of “moral hazard” that a rational course of action
would avoid (Shepherd 2009, Hale 2012).
In other conjectures, the concerns lie with the behavior of the future generation. Future
decision-makers may engage in climate engineering under circumstances and on a scale that
the current generation would not hold to be optimal. At least three mechanisms are thought
to explain why future generations may deviate from the judicious course of action. One is
behavioral: Given the impression of an impending or immediate “climate emergency”, there
is a belief that decision-makers will succumb to emotional factors that favor SRM deployment
as a ’quick fix’ (e.g. Bodansky 1996).1 Similarly, while sunk cost of its development should
on rational grounds be immaterial to the decision on whether to deploy SRM technology,
there is ample historical experience that use of a capability is often regarded as necessary to
justify large sunk cost (Gardiner 2011). The second mechanism lies in the political economy
of science and technology: Researchers and industry funded to carry out research on certain
technologies become interest groups in favor of technology deployment, creating a vocal and
influential lobby for SRM use (Jamieson 1996).2 The final mechanism is the potential for a
genuine change of preferences regarding SRM once its availability has become a fact of life
for a future generation.3 Irrespective of the mechanism, a bias in favor of SRM interventions,
1The American Meteorological Society, for instance, believes that “[...]geoengineering technologies, once
developed, may enable short-sighted and unwise deployment decisions, with potentially serious unforeseen
consequences.” (2009)
2This concern is also present among the general public. Mercer et al (2011) report very strong agreement
on the statement that “Research will lead to a technology that will be used no matter what the public thinks.”
among participants in a large-scale international survey of public perceptions of climate engineering.
3Already in one of the early reports by the US National Academy of Sciences on climate change, the authors
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once those technological capabilities have been created, is the argument underpinning two
additional conjectures advanced in the literature. One is that the rational course of action
for today’s generation is to rule out research on geoengineering measures in order to prevent
the future generation from acting against its own best interests (Keith et al. 2010).4 The
fifth conjecture is a different interpretation of the “moral hazard” argument by Bunzl (2009)
and turns the logic on its head. It postulates that in the face of a pro-CE bias among the
future generation, the rational course of action is to offer SRM as a backstop for a “climate
emergency” and to abate less. The reason is that in a world in which the future generation
uses SRM indiscriminately, the carbon stock damages imposed on the future generation are
consistently lower than in the absence of SRM capabilities. As a result, the current generation
would be treated more equitably if it allowed itself to emit more (Hale 2012).
Against this background of competing conjectures, this paper makes two contributions.
The first is to extend the economic literature on the intergenerational aspects of climate pol-
icy in the direction of technology transfers. To our knowledge, the transfer of a mitigating
technology, such as SRM, to a future generation that bears the damage costs of a stock pol-
lutant has not been explicitly considered before. The second contribution is to demonstrate
how simple economic analysis can provide a useful starting point for discriminating between
the different conjectures on the ’right’ course of action regarding a portfolio of both mitiga-
tion and SRM R&D activities. We provide these contributions by developing the simplest
two-generations model that captures the four joint premises that appear to underpin all con-
jectures. These common elements are (i) that the current generation cares about the future
generation sufficiently to be concerned about the stock damages of atmospheric carbon, (ii)
that there may be a pro-SRM bias in the future, (iii) that both abatement and R&D involve
a cost today and (iv) that both determine, in an environment characterized by uncertainty
about the damages associated with atmospheric carbon, the future generation’s carbon stock
and technological capabilities. Using this model, we study the subgame perfect behavior of
the current generation in order to determine which of the conjectures above can arise, and if
so, under which conditions.
Our results demonstrate that the possibility of transferring mitigating technologies into
the future both re-emphasizes important economic insights on climate policy and raises im-
portant new issues. For example, even in the absence of a pro-SRM bias, the presence of an
SRM option offsets current abatement. Far from constituting an instance of “moral hazard”
(Bunzl 2009), this is simply a result of the partial substitutability between abatement and
SRM that a current generation will rationally want to exploit. At the same time, the presence
of a pro-SRM bias will constitute an important source of potentially powerful strategic dis-
tortions between generations that support some of the conjectures, but not all. A failure to
raise the possibility that interest in CO2 may generate or reinforce a lasting interest in national or international
means of climate and weather modification; once generated, that interest may flourish independent of whatever
is done about CO2 (p. 470).
4Ruling out CE research could take the shape of the recent explicit ban on climate engineering R&D that
was declared at the Conference of the Parties of the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity in Nagoya in
2010.
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carefully define those comparisons that are meaningful may be to blame for some of the con-
fusion. As the analysis makes clear, rising R&D costs lead ceteris paribus always to ruling out
SRM research for rational reasons. The same holds for an increasing pro-SRM bias. However,
providing no SRM R&D will always be combined with higher abatement levels than if SRM
was made available. At the same time, we find no support for the conjecture that abatement
weakens due to a distortion between generations if R&D is undertaken. Quite the opposite:
If SRM is made available, abatement will never fall below the non-distortion benchmark but
increase the higher the distortion between generations. That abatement will increase even if
SRM is provided is a new finding that has not been discussed before. The intuition is that
an altruistic current generation can and will want to partially offset a pro-SRM bias among
the future generation by providing more abatement today, thus reducing the incentives to
deploy SRM in the future.
We proceed as follows. In the following section, we develop the simple two-generations
model that captures the salient components of the SRM R&D debate in the most parsimonious
and tractable fashion. In section 3, we provide a major step in the debate by defining the
meaningful comparison point by the way of a benchmark. Section 4 derives the equilibria of
the intergenerational game and establishes the main propositions. In section 5, we conclude.
2 The Model
2.1 The setting
Here, we develop a setting that pares an intergenerational decision problem involving both
a stock pollutant and the development of an imperfect backstop technology down to its very
essentials. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the setting, which features four
periods. While the building blocks on stock pollution, abatement, and damages are taken
from the mainstream literature, the novel aspects are the inclusion of the climate engineering
option and the associated intergenerational issues so as to capture the common narrative
elements described in the introduction.
R&D 
Choice  
 
Abatement 
Choice 
 
Climate 
Sensitivity 
Revealed 
Climate  
Engineering 
Choice 
Outcomes 
Current  
Generation Nature 
Future  
Generation 
A∈ 0,∞)#$Θ∈ 0,1{ } λ ∈ λ,λ{ } D ∈ 0,∞)#$
Figure 1: Timing of the game.
The basic set-up consists of two non-overlapping generations, termed “current” and “fu-
ture”. The current generation decides in period 1 on whether to invest in R&D for future
SRM capabilities (Θ = 1) or not (Θ = 0) and chooses pollution abatement level A in period
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2.5 R&D of SRM involves technological as well as regulatory and institutional costs that will
allow the future generation to use the climate engineering technology. These costs could be
significant (Klepper and Rickels 2012). In period 3, nature resolves the key scientific uncer-
tainty about climate change (Roe and Baker 2007), namely the climate sensitivity parameter
λ that in turn determines the marginal damages associated with the future global carbon
stock. In period 4, the future generation decides whether to deploy the SRM technology in
order to counteract the damages T from the unabated pollution stock. If it deploys SRM
(D > 0), the future generation reduces damages from the carbon stock, but suffers environ-
mental damages G associated with the use of SRM, e.g. in the form of disruptions of the
hydrological cycle. If no SRM is used (D = 0), future society faces the full temperature
damages T .
As other tractable economic models of climate change, we specify the damages associated
with the global carbon stock as caused by increased temperatures above historical averages.
We employ the temperature damage function T by Moreno-Cruz and Keith (2012) of the
form
T = λ2 (R0 −A)2 . (1)
The damage function consists of two arguments: The first argument is the squared carbon
sensitivity of the climate to a doubling of CO2, λ. The second argument is the square of the net
deviation in the carbon stock from historical levels (R0 −A), which consists of the business-
as-usual increase in the carbon stock R0 minus the abatement effort A.
6 From the vantage
point of the current generation, i.e. in periods 1 and 2, the carbon sensitivity is a random
variable with two possible realizations: a carbon-sensitive value of λ¯ > 0 with probability
p and a carbon-insensitive value λ (0 < λ < λ¯) with probability (1− p). As expression (1)
makes clear, abatement is productive as it reduces the expected value of pollution damages
associated with climate change. Along with all moves {Θ, A}, the pollution damage function
(1) is common knowledge.
Abatement costs are usually assumed to be convex in abatement efforts. As a simple
approximation, we model the abatement cost function of the quadratic type
X = αA2 , (2)
with increasing marginal abatement cost 2αA. The R&D process is modeled in a deterministic
fashion, following Goeschl and Perino (2007): R&D for a functioning SRM technology requires
payment of a fixed amount K in period 2 and delivers the climate engineering technology by
period 4. The cost of not providing the SRM technology (Θ = 0) is zero.
The second option to counteract temperature damages, which can be combined with
abatement, is the deployment of SRM. Like the abatement level A, we measure the amount
D of deployed SRM in terms of compensated carbon stock (cf. Moreno-Cruz and Keith 2012)
such that temperature damages read T = λ2 (R0 −A−D)2. In that sense, abatement and
5The sequentiality of the decisions on Θ and A is purely for ease of presentation. A simultaneous choice of
Θ and A leads to identical results.
6Temperature damages are assumed to be quadratic in temperature increases. The latter are assumed to
be linear in the pollutant stock change
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SRM are equivalent regarding temperature damage compensation. They differ, however, in
terms of timing and costs.
The use of SRM involves negligible direct costs (Barrett 2008), but causes collateral
damages because of unintended negative impacts. These negative impacts comprise changes
in the hydrological cycle and increase in air pollution, according to current assessments (Ricke
et al. 2010; Kravitz et al. 2009). The general form of the damages G from SRM is a higher-
order polynomial involving the volume of aerosol injected into the stratosphere (D), the net
carbon stock increase (R0 −A), and various particle characteristics (Bala et al. 2010; Caldeira
and Wood 2008; Ricke et al. 2010). Recent simulations with general circulation models have
shown, however, that the changes in temperature and precipitation are disproportionately
driven by the linear term attached to the volume of SRM (Ban-Weiss and Caldeira 2010;
Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012). A first approximation of the current generation’s assessment of
SRM damages would therefore specify an essentially linear relationship between damages and
the amount D of SRM of the form
G = ρD (3)
with ρ denoting the constant marginal value of SRM damages. An immediately obvious
economic viability condition for SRM is that ρ < 2αR0. Otherwise, the marginal cost of even
the last unit of abatement is lower than the marginal damage of SRM, implying that SRM
is never a competitive substitute for abatement.
The final component to make the setting reflect the current literature is a device that
captures the possible presence of a bias of the future generation in favor of SRM deployment.
The bias implies that unit for unit, the future generation values SRM damages generally
less than the current generation for reasons of behavioral mechanisms, political economy, or
genuine preference shifts. As a shorthand for this divergence between current and future
generations, we introduce a bias parameter β ∈ [0, 1] such that from the future generation’s
vantage point, damages are G˜ = (1− β)ρD. If there is no bias (β = 0), then the current and
the future generation have an identical relative valuation between temperature damages and
SRM damages.
2.2 Objectives and equilibrium concept
Against this background, we now define the objective functions, payoffs, and strategies of
both generations. The future generation’s objective is to minimize the sum of pollution
damages and SRM damages, taking the choices of the current generation on abatement and
R&D and the realization of climate sensitivity λ as given. Given R&D on SRM, the future
generation can determine its optimal volume of SRM, D∗, that is how much of the inherited
carbon stock should be compensated for by means of SRM. The optimal volume of SRM is a
function of the abatement level A, the realized climate sensitivity λ and the bias parameter
β. The future generation’s problem is therefore
min
D∈[0,R0−A]
{
λ2(R0 −A−D)2 + (1− β)ρD
}
. (4)
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It is both intuitively obvious and clear from the first-order conditions that use of SRM requires
that (1−β)ρ < 2λ2(R0−A), i.e. the marginal damage of the first unit of SRM must be below
the temperature damages thus avoided. Otherwise, the corner solution D∗ = 0 is optimal.
For D∗ > 0, the optimal amount is given by D∗(A, λ, β) = R0 −A− (1−β)ρ2λ2 .
From the vantage point of the current generation, the combination of the two possible
realizations of climate sensitivity λ and the conditions on corner and interior solutions give
rise to three possible deployment profiles. One profile, Duncond, implies use of SRM by the
future generation irrespective of whether the climate turns out to be sensitive or insensitive
to carbon. Another, Dnever, features no use of SRM, even if the climate turns out to be
sensitive to carbon. The third, Dcond, conditions the use of SRM on the climate sensitivity,
using SRM for a sensitive outcome and not using SRM for an insensitive one. The profiles
are defined by
Duncond =
R0 −A−
(1−β)ρ
2λ¯2
if λ = λ¯
R0 −A− (1−β)ρ2λ2 if λ = λ
, Dcond =
R0 −A−
(1−β)ρ
2λ¯2
if λ = λ¯
0 if λ = λ
Dnever =
0 if λ = λ¯0 if λ = λ . (5)
Due to a decrease of perceived damages caused by SRM, an increase in the bias β increases
the SRM amount deployed. For β = 1, which refers to future generation attributing no
damages to the use of SRM, temperature damages will be fully compensated, T = 0.
A quick inspection of the deployment profiles shows that the current generation, given its
belief about the future generation’s β, determines which profile will be chosen in the future
through its choice of abatement A. More specifically, there is a lower and an upper threshold
on abatement, with Acrit = R0 − (1−β)ρ2λ2 and A¯crit = R0 −
(1−β)ρ
2λ¯2
respectively, such that
D∗ =

Duncond if A ≤ Acrit ≤ A¯crit
Dcond if Acrit ≤ A ≤ A¯crit
Dnever if Acrit ≤ A¯crit ≤ A .
(6)
Through sufficiently high abatement, therefore, the current generation can ensure that
SRM will never be used. Conversely, by abating little, available SRM would always be used at
some positive level, even if the climate turns out to be relatively insensitive to carbon stocks.
Finally, abatement levels between the two critical thresholds give rise to SRM deployment
that is conditional on the realization of carbon sensitivity of the climate. Here, SRM would
only be used in the eventuality of a sensitive climate.7
The optimal choice of costly SRM R&D Θ in period 1 and abatement A in period 2 con-
stitute the essence of the current generation’s problem. In its choice, the current generation
takes into account both the costs to itself (in the form of R&D and abatement costs) and
the costs borne by the future generation (in the form of damages). The cost minimization
7Note that the deployment profiles Duncond and Dcond become indistinguishable at the abatement level
Acrit. The same holds for Dcond and Dnever at A¯crit.
7
objective requires that current and future costs need to be made comparable through an
appropriate discount factor δ. The objective function is then given by
min
Θ,A
C(Θ, A |β) = min
Θ,A
{
ΘK + αA2+
δ(1− p) (λ2(R0 −A−D(A, λ, β))2 + ρD(A, λ, β))+
δp
(
λ¯2(R0 −A−D(A, λ¯, β))2 + ρD(A, λ¯, β)
)}
. (7)
For ease of exposition, we set δ = 1 (no discounting). Also note that the objective function
of the current generation makes explicit reference to β since the bias determines profile
and amount of SRM deployment. We thus analyze functions of the form C(Θ, A |β) or,
equivalently, the form C(Θ, A |D) where D denotes a certain deployment profile.
The optimal abatement levels differ depending on whether there is R&D on SRM or not.
If no SRM R&D is carried out, Θ = 0, the future generation cannot deploy the technology.
This simplifies the objective function since D = 0 for all A, λ and β. The associated optimal
abatement level is
ANoR&D =
pλ¯2 + (1− p)λ2
α+ pλ¯2 + (1− p)λ2R0 > 0 , (8)
which is a fraction of the business-as-usual increase in the carbon stock R0. In line with
intuition, abatement in the absence of SRM increases with a higher probability of a carbon-
sensitive climate ( ddpANoR&D > 0) and for higher levels of sensitivity (
d
dλ¯
ANoR&D > 0,
d
dλANoR&D > 0). The higher marginal abatement costs (higher α), the lower the abate-
ment level: While costless abatement (α = 0) leads to full compensation, ANoR&D = R0,
abatement goes down to zero if marginal abatement costs tend to infinity.
If SRM R&D is carried out, Θ = 1, the choice of the optimal A is more intricate because a
change in A influences the future generation’s discrete decision which of the three deployment
profiles to choose. The objective function is therefore only piecewise differentiable and the
optimal abatement level in each segment is not necessarily an interior solution. At the same
time, note that the bias parameter β influences the choice of A only through its impact
on the deployment profile; within one profile β has no impact on the abatement choice as
d
dβ
(
d
dAD(A, λ, β)
)
= 0. This is an interesting property that results from the dominance of
the linear component in SRM damages and that will be exploited in section 4.
From an abstract point of view, the model set-up and objectives that capture the nar-
ratives on whether the current generation should develop SRM capabilities for the future
generation define a sequential game with incomplete information. Its basic structure, in
particular the technology transfer decision, is a variant of the trust game by Kreps (1990).
However, the intergenerational decision problem here features two important differences: One
is the availability of the second instrument in the form of abatement, the other the presence
of exogenous uncertainty in the form of the random variable λ. The proper solution concept
for determining the equilibrium played by the current and future generation is that of sub-
game perfection (SP). The current generation, looking forward, employs backward induction
to solve problem (7): By determining the optimal play of future generation (D∗|A, λ, β) in
period 4 contingent on current generation’s choices in periods 1 and 2 and nature’s move in
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period 3, it identifies its own optimal play {Θ∗, A∗} in periods 1 and 2. However, it has to do
so not knowing λ (see Figure 1). The equilibrium concept of SP will admit some combina-
tions of abatement and R&D choices but not others, and thus impose elementary consistency
checks on current society’s rational course of action.
3 The Benchmark
Using the framework presented above, the purpose of the following two sections is to explore
the consistency of different conjectures regarding the current generation’s rational course of
action.
We proceed by constructing and establishing, as the first building block, a suitable bench-
mark case. Such a case is one in which (i) the bias of the future generation with respect to
damages from SRM is set to zero by assumption and (ii) where equilibrium play features the
current generation engaging in SRM R&D and the future generation adopting a conditional
deployment profile. This choice of a benchmark has three benefits: The first is that in the
comparisons in section 4 with situations involving a bias, the strategic distortions introduced
by the bias will be clearly identifiable. The second benefit is that this benchmark case demon-
strates the consistency of the “arming the future” conjecture for a given parameter set and
thus establishes one of the five conjectures as a candidate for the rational course of action.
Thirdly, the benchmark case also demonstrates that even in the absence of the bias, the
rational course of action involves certain subtleties that the discussion on developing SRM
technologies has so far failed to identify.
In the spirit of keeping notation clutter to a minimum, we assign values to some parame-
ters. We restrict the level of abatement to the unit interval by setting R0 = 1. Furthermore,
marginal temperature and SRM damages will be regarded in terms of abatement costs by
assuming α = 1 such that abatement costs are simply A2. Finally, we set λ = 1 such that
λ¯ > 1 captures temperature damages for high carbon sensitivity, relative to a fixed baseline.
These restrictions preserve the relevant degrees of freedom of the model and simplify the
analysis substantially.
The benchmark case assumes the absence of a bias of the future generation with respect
to SRM damages, β = 0.8 To fix notation, equilibrium play in the benchmark case is
characterized by current generations SRM R&D decision Θˆ and abatement level Aˆ as well as
the future generation’s deployment profile Dˆ. For the conjecture of “arming the future” to
survive the consistency check then requires that equilibrium play can give rise to a decision to
conduct R&D on SRM, Θˆ = 1, and an abatement level Aˆ that induces the future generation
to choose the conditional deployment profile of the SRM technology: Dˆ(Aˆ, β = 0) = Dcond.
Under these conditions, the current generation will make SRM capabilities available to the
future generation alongside an optimal abatement effort to be determined, and the future
generation will use SRM technologies only in case that the climate system turns out to be
8In terms of interpretation, β = 0 could mean that the future generation has the same preferences as
current generation or that current generation is just ignorant of an existing asymmetry.
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carbon sensitive. The future generation, in other words, will be “armed” against inadvertent
outcomes in the climate system.
We begin the construction of the benchmark case with the convenient assumption that the
abatement level associated with equilibrium play in the “arming the future” conjecture ought
to be an interior solution. The interior solution to the current generation’s cost-minimization
problem (7) assuming a conditional SRM deployment profile is given by
Acond =
2(1− p) + pρ
2(2− p) . (9)
What parameter restrictions follow from designating Acond as our solution Aˆ? These param-
eter restrictions can be summarized as restrictions on the marginal damage from SRM, ρ,
and on the R&D cost of SRM, K. Note first that designating Acond as Aˆ requires that the
abatement level Acond chosen by the current generation actually gives rise to a conditional
deployment profile by the future generation. Formally,
Acrit(β = 0) < Acond < A¯crit(β = 0) . (10)
The level of abatement therefore has to lie in the middle segment defined in equation (6).
Designating Acond as Aˆ therefore translates into a condition on the parameter ρ: The marginal
damages of SRM ρ have to fulfill that 1 < ρ < 2λ¯
2
2+p(λ¯2−1) . Together with the economic viability
condition for SRM ρ < 2αR0 = 2 (cf. section 2.1), this requires that the marginal damages
of SRM fulfill
ρ ∈
(
1 , min
{
2,
2λ¯2
2 + p(λ¯2 − 1)
})
(11)
in order for Acond to be feasible as Aˆ. The intuition is straightforward: If ρ < 1, SRM
damages are too small to give rise to conditional deployment of SRM and an unconditional
deployment profile would be optimal instead. On the other hand, if ρ > 2λ¯
2
2+p(λ¯2−1) damages
caused by SRM are too large and the optimal deployment profile would be to never use the
technology. In this last case the amount of abatement would be larger than A¯crit.
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The restrictions on ρ ensure that the deployment profile chosen will indeed be conditional
on the realization of λ. Since these restriction cannot by themselves guarantee that there
is not some other abatement level that involves lower cost than Acond, restrictions on K
are also required. To do so, we compare the total costs of the conditional profile, and
associated abatement level Acond, with the costs of the profile without SRM deployment
and the unconditional deployment profile (see section 2.2), with their respective optimal
abatement levels. First, the total costs of the conditional profile have to be lower than those
of the unconditional deployment profile. That is,
C(Θ = 1, Acond |Dcond) < C(Θ = 1, Acrit |Duncond) , (12)
9It should not come as a surprise that the upper bound increases with λ¯; that is, if the climate system is
more climate sensitive, SRM damages can be larger and still allow for a conditional use profile. Less obvious is
the fact that the upper bound decreases with p. An increase in p makes the upper limit more stringent because
Acond increases with p, but A¯crit does not (whether the future generation deploys SRM does not depend on
ex-ante probabilities). As p increases, the current generation has an incentive to increase Acond and minimize
now higher expected future costs which in turn reduces the need for SRM deployment.
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where C(Θ = 1, Acrit |Duncond) are the minimum costs under the indiscriminate use of SRM.10
This is equivalent with (ρ−1)
2
2−p > 0, which is always satisfied. Restrictions on K therefore need
to come from the second comparison between the total costs of the conditional profile and
those of the no SRM deployment profile, taking into account that conditional deployment
requires investing in SRM R&D. For conditional deployment to involve lower cost requires
that
C(Θ = 1, Acond |Dcond) < C(Θ = 0, ANoR&D) |Dnever) . (13)
This requirement translates into a limit on how costly SRM R&D can be:
K < K¯ :=
p
(
ρ(2 + p(λ¯2 − 1))− 2λ¯2)2
4(2− p)λ¯2(2 + p(λ¯2 − 1)) . (14)
Taking the above restrictions on ρ and K together, the parameter requirements for the
benchmark case are thus fully characterized. More importantly still, there is no evidence
of logical contradictions that would rule out equilibrium play according to the “arming the
future” conjecture if there is no bias among the future generation: There is nothing inherently
contradictory about the current generation providing both abatement and SRM R&D to the
future generation such that this technology can be used as a backstop in the event of a
carbon-sensitive climate.
Before exploring the impact of a bias regarding SRM use among the future generation, it
is useful to point out two features of the benchmark equilibrium. One is the abatement level:
The abatement level Aˆ = Acond is smaller than the abatement level which would be optimal
without SRM, Acond < ANoR&D. From an economic perspective, this is not surprising: Since
abatement is costly, the ability to counteract the adverse effects of a pollutant implies that a
a higher pollution stock can be tolerated. Contrary to the characterization as “moral hazard”
(see introduction), this reduction in abatement is therefore an optimal response. Whether
the “moral hazard” argument has traction in a setting in which there is a bias among genera-
tions is a key question of the following section: it is conceivable that strategic considerations
may lead to a suboptimal reduction on abatement, that is a level of abatement that is lower
than Acond. The second instructive feature of the benchmark are its comparative statics.
The benchmark abatement level Acond responds in a predictable fashion to an increasing
likelihood of a “climate emergency” as well as higher marginal damages of SRM. In both
cases, we see higher levels of abatement since ddpAcond > 0 and
d
dρAcond > 0. The threshold
level of R&D costs also responds predictably to stronger climate damages (the willingness to
equip future generation with the technology increases) and higher marginal damages of SRM
(opposite effect) since K¯ reveal d
dλ¯
K¯ > 0 and ddρK¯ < 0 where the inequalities follow from
(14). Its response to an increase in the probability of a “climate emergency” is less intuitive,
however: the sign of ddpK¯ is ambiguous. Increases in p at small levels of p tend to increase
the threshold K¯ while the opposite is true at high levels of p. The intuition behind this result
is that if the “climate emergency” is a low-probability event, the backstop characteristic of
10The function C(Θ, A |Duncond) is a convex quadratic function in A with first derivative −2(ρ − 1) at
A = Acrit. This is negative due to the benchmark condition (4). This shows that Acrit is the minimizer of
C(Θ = 1, A |Duncond) in [0, Acrit]
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SRM dominates. An increase in the probability in this region strengthens the incentives to
provide SRM irrespective of R&D costs. It would not make sense here to sacrifice too much
in abatement cost but rather provide the option to counteract climate damages if these turn
out to be high. If, however, a certain threshold for p is reached the “climate emergency” is
more prevalent and, in order to minimize expected damages, the current generation draws
larger levels of abatement. But with higher abatement levels, the role for SRM is reduced and
with it, the incentives to pay for R&D. This intuition is reflected in ANoR&D being a concave
function in p with large increases for small p while Acond is convex in p, thus featuring higher
increases for higher levels of the p. The surprising result here is that there is no monotonic
relationship between the severity of the responsive climate and the willingness to develop the
technology. While the incentives to provide the future generation with SRM increase in the
marginal damages λ¯, that is not necessarily the case in terms of increases in the likelihood p
of the “climate emergency”.
4 Strategic distortions
Having established the benchmark equilibrium, we can now study how the rational course
of action is impacted when the current generation anticipates a bias of the future genera-
tion when assessing SRM damages from geoengineering technologies relative to temperature
damages from the carbon stock. In particular, we are interested in the effects on the current
generation’s R&D decision and abatement choice {Θˆ, Aˆ}. In the interest of space, we immedi-
ately proceed to a full characterization of the intergenerational carbon stock and technology
transfer game in β-K-space before providing the analysis that underpins this characteriza-
tion. We then relate this characterization to the question of which of the five conjectures on
current society’s rational course of action survive the consistency test. We find that only some
conjectures pass this test. However, a sixth conjecture that has so far not been discussed in
the literature emerges as a candidate for how current society could rationally approach this
intergenerational decision.
4.1 The full characterization
Figure 2 depicts the subgame perfect equilibria of the intergenerational carbon stock and
technology transfer game in β-K-space. The x-axis is defined by the bias parameter β,
which denotes the degree to which the future generation discounts SRM damages vis-a`-vis
temperature damages relative to the current generation. The y-axis is defined by the cost
parameter K, which denotes how much the current generation has to sacrifice to provide the
future generation with SRM technologies. The upper bound of the x-axis, β = 1, refers to
a level of bias at which the future generation attaches no damages to SRM deployment and
therefore compensates temperature damages completely through geoengineering. The upper
bound of the y-axis, K¯, derives from expression (14) of the benchmark case and is the level
of R&D costs at which the current generation is indifferent between providing the technology
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and not.
The benchmark case can be seen in Figure 2 as the line for which β = 0, the y-axis.
The area to the right of the benchmark consists of four distinct zones. The north-east of
the area is taken up by zone I in which no R&D is provided for the future generation, i.e.
Θ = 0. This zone is associated with a fixed abatement level ANoR&D irrespective of the bias
β because the future generation’s relative valuation of SRM damages is immaterial when
no SRM technology is provided. On the y-axis, the boundary of this zone, KBan, naturally
starts at K¯ for β = 0 (see above) and decreases as β increases. As a result, zone I takes up
an increasing amount of parameter space for higher levels of bias β. The other three zones,
namely zones II, III, and IV, are all associated with the provision of R&D by the current
generation, i.e. Θ = 1, but differ with respect to the abatement levels chosen by the current
and the deployment profiles chosen by the future generation. The boundaries between zones
II and III and zones III and IV are each defined by a critical threshold condition on β and
do not depend on K.
Figure 2: Equilibria in the intergenerational decision problem. The axes are the bias of the
future generation β and the costs of SRM R&D K.
4.2 Equilibria under SRM R&D (Θ = 1)
With these basic features of Figure 2 established, we now proceed to explain how its geometry
depends on the bias parameter β and the cost of R&D, K. To do so, assume for the moment
that R&D is always carried out, i.e. Θ = 1.
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Small bias (zone II) Then, starting from the benchmark case (β = 0), we can analyze
what happens to abatement and deployment as β increases. Recall that in the benchmark
case, equilibrium play consists of abatement of amount Aˆ = Acond by the current gener-
ation and of a conditional deployment profile Dcond by the future generation. Also recall
from section 2.2 that as long as the conditional deployment profile is the future generation’s
best response, the current generation will find it optimal to stick to the benchmark level of
abatement Aˆ even at higher levels of β.
Expression (6) in section 2 defined the conditions under which sticking to the conditional
deployment profile is no longer a best response for the future generation. These conditions
were set by two thresholds regarding the current generation’s abatement, Acrit and A¯crit.
Observe now that both thresholds increase in β. As a result, the abatement level Aˆ that
gave rise to conditional deployment at low levels of β can now give rise to unconditional
deployment as a best response. This is the case if β exceeds some critical value βcrit. The
critical value is the level of β at which Acrit(β) exceeds Aˆ = Acond and is given by
βcrit :=
2(ρ− 1)
(2− p)ρ . (15)
Formally, the best-response deployment profile follows
D∗(Aˆ, β) =
Dcond 0 ≤ β ≤ βcritDuncond βcrit < β ≤ 1 . (16)
A straightforward implication of (16) and the assumption of an interior equilibrium for the
benchmark case, which is associated with ρ > 1 in equation (11), is the existence of a non-
empty interval of β ∈ [0, βcrit] for which the benchmark solution will be the equilibrium play
despite the presence of a bias. For the geometry of Figure 2, βcrit defines the boundary
between zones II and III and implies that zone II always exists and that equilibrium play
within zone II follows the benchmark case.
Large bias (zone IV) Starting from the opposite end of the interval of bias, as announced
in the beginning of this section, we now examine optimal play for the case of β = 1 when
Θ = 1. Again, from expression (6) and (5) in section 2, it is clear that the future generation
will always deploy SRM in a way to fully offset the temperature damages. Deployment will
therefore be D = 1−A irrespective of λ. The current generation’s best response to this is to
choose abatement level Auncond =
ρ
2 because Auncond minimizes the total cost to the current
generation in the face of unconditional deployment in the future, given that R&D is carried
out. This abatement level is strictly greater than that which is optimal under conditional
deployment, which reflects that it is cheaper for the current generation to counteract the
future generation’s “abuse” of SRM technologies through increased abatement, and hence
less SRM deployment. Just as with the benchmark case, the question arises over what
interval of β this equilibrium play persists, now going in the opposite direction (decreasing
β). In the benchmark case, we observed that as long as conditional deployment remained the
best response of the future generation, the current generation did not adjust its abatement.
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The same logic applies here: As long as unconditional deployment remains the best response
of the future generation, the current generation does not deviate from Auncond. How low
can β be for unconditional deployment to remain the best response to Auncond? Broadly
analogously to the previous case, the critical value now is the level of β at which Acrit(β) falls
below Auncond and is given by
β¯ :=
2(ρ− 1)
ρ
. (17)
Casual inspection makes clear that there is always a non-empty interval of β ∈ [β¯, 1] for
which a combination of abatement at Auncond by the current generation and unconditional
deployment by the future generation will be the equilibrium play when Θ = 1. For the
geometry of Figure 2, β¯ defines the boundary between zones IV and III and implies that zone
IV always exists.
Medium bias - abatement as a strategic instrument (zone III) The strategically
subtlest case arises for degrees of bias between the two boundaries βcrit and β¯. This is always
a non-empty interval (except for the degenerate case that p = 1) as is obvious from inspecting
the boundary expressions. Zone III therefore exists. In order to understand equilibrium play
in this interval, recall that βcrit denoted the threshold for values of β above which Acond no
longer induced conditional deployment as a best response and that β¯ denoted the threshold
for values of β below which Auncond no longer induced unconditional deployment as a best re-
sponse. To find the amount for abatement that is both cost-minimizing and subgame-perfect
in this interval, it is helpful to start from the threshold Acrit which separates those abate-
ment levels that induce unconditional (to the left of Acrit) from those that induce conditional
deployment (to the right of Acrit). It should be clear that for unconditional deployment, if
subgame perfection was not a requirement, the cost-minimizing level of abatement Auncond
would lie to the right of Acrit. Subgame perfection in this β-zone, however, requires an
abatement level not above Acrit and thus smaller than Auncond. At Acrit, marginal total costs
are still decreasing. Therefore, Acrit must be the cost-minimizing subgame perfect choice of
abatement if the current generation wants to induce unconditional deployment.
The case of the current generation wanting to induce conditional deployment is a mirror
image of the case above: If subgame perfection was not a requirement, the cost-minimizing
level of abatement Acond would lie to the left of Acrit. However, subgame perfection in this
zone requires an abatement level not below Acrit and thus greater than Acond. At Acrit,
marginal total costs are already increasing. Therefore, Acrit must be the cost-minimizing
subgame perfect choice of abatement if the current generation wants to induce conditional
deployment. Taken together, Acrit is the cost-minimizing subgame perfect choice of abatement
in zone III. At Acrit, the conditional and unconditional deployment profiles become indistin-
guishable because the level of unconditional deployment in the case of carbon-insensitive
climate becomes zero. Note that in contrast to the cost-minimizing subgame perfect abate-
ment levels in zones II and IV which are independent of β, equilibrium play in zone III
features abatement that increases in β.
We now have a complete picture of equilibrium abatement and SRM deployment in zones
15
II, III, and IV, i.e. under the assumption that R&D is carried out by the current generation.11
What remains to be shown is under what conditions the provision of R&D indeed constitutes a
rational course of action by the current generation. Given the presence of strategic distortions
in equilibrium play in zones II, III, and IV depending on the degree of the bias β, not providing
SRM technologies in the first place may be the cost-minizing choice. The key determinant of
this decision is the cost of R&D. To this we turn now.
4.3 Equilibrium R&D decision (Θ = 0 vs. Θ = 1)
Recall from above that if no R&D is carried out (Θ = 0), then there is a unique abatement
level ANoR&D chosen by the current generation. The future generation is forced into never
deploying SRM. Therefore, D = 0. The expected total costs from this course of action
are C(Θ = 0, ANoR&D|Dnever). For equilibrium play under Θ = 1 to be selected as the
rational course of action, it needs to feature lower cost than C(Θ = 0, ANoR&D|Dnever) despite
involving R&D cost K. What is required therefore is to compare total expected costs in each
of the zones II, III, and IV with the total expected costs from not carrying out R&D and to
determine the condition on K for R&D still to be provided. The condition that results for
each zone each constitutes a segment of the boundary KBan in Figure 2 that separates the
no-R&D zone I from the three R&D zones II, III, and IV.
We first compare the boundary between zone II and zone I. The costs we have to compare
are C(Θ = 1, Acond|Dcond) and C(Θ = 0, ANoR&D|Dnever). We are looking for a condition
under which no R&D involves lower cost than providing R&D together with abatement of
amount Acond. Simple algebraic operations translate this comparison into a condition on K
of the form
K > KBanII (β) = K¯ −
pρ2
4λ¯2
β2. (18)
The boundary between zone III and zone I involves a comparison of costs C(Θ = 1, Acrit|Dcond),
which are by the definition ofAcrit equal to C(Θ = 1, Acrit|Duncond), and C(Θ = 0, ANoR&D|Dnever).
For no R&D to be cost-minimizing requires that
K > KBanIII (β) = K¯III −
(
p+ (2− p)λ¯2) ρ2
4λ¯2
(β − βIII)2 (19)
with βIII =
ρ−1
ρ
2λ¯2
2λ¯2−p(λ¯2−1) and K¯III = K¯ −
p(ρ−1)
(2−p)(2λ¯2−p(λ¯2−1)) . It is easy to show that
βIII ∈ [0, βcrit].
The boundary between zone IV and zone I involves a comparison of costs C(Θ = 1, Auncond|Duncond)
and C(Θ = 0, ANoR&D|Dnever). For no R&D to be cost-minimizing requires that
K > KBanIV (β) = K¯IV −
p+ (1− p)λ¯2
4λ¯2
β2 (20)
11An interested reader might ask how the thresholds that separate zones II, III and IV, βcrit and β¯, depend on
model parameters. We have d
dp
βcrit > 0 and
d
dρ
βcrit > 0. Increasing technology damages and likelihood of bad
outcomes thus both expand the first region. The intuition is that both changes lead to a higher benchmark
level Aˆ which is then more robust to deviations in SRM damage assessment β. The second threshold, β¯,
depends only on ρ. The derivative is d
dρ
β¯ > 0 and larger than d
dρ
βcrit because higher SRM damages reduce
its desirability stronger if it is to be always deployed compared to conditional deployment. Thus, increasing
damages of the technology make region IV smaller and enlarge both region II and region III.
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where K¯IV = K¯ +
(1−p)(ρ−1)2
2−p .
Note that the segments derived above form a continuous boundary KBan since KBanII =
KBanIII and K
Ban
III = K
Ban
IV at the relevant thresholds βcrit and β¯, respectively. Also note
that KBan varies monotonously in the bias β since ddβK
Ban
i < 0 for all segments i. This
confirms our earlier intuition that for the same level of R&D costs K, an increase in the
bias β renders not carrying out R&D a relative more attractive course of action because the
strategic distortions between the generations increase in β.12
4.4 Surviving conjectures
In this final substantive section of the paper, we relate the full characterization of the in-
tergenerational carbon stock and technology transfer game back to the conjectures about
the rational course of action for current society that appear in the current literature and
that we reviewed in the introduction. Based on the preceding analysis, it is now possible to
make statements about the degree to which different conjectures can be replicated in a simple
model that captures the four common elements of (i) intergenerational altruism, (ii) possible
pro-SRM bias, (iii) costly abatement and R&D, and (iv) intergenerational transmission of
carbon stocks and technology under uncertainty about the climate system.
We identified five conjectures that share these common elements, yet differ markedly in
their conclusions. One conjecture termed “arming the future” postulates that current soci-
ety will find it rational to provide SRM technologies as a backstop for inadvertent climate
outcomes while providing significant abatement. We were able to replicate this conjecture
without problems and used it as the benchmark case for understanding the strategic distor-
tions introduced by anticipating a bias among the future generation that implicitly favors
the deployment of SRM. By contrast, the “abatement invariance” conjecture, namely that
abatement should be unaffected by the decision to conduct R&D into SRM (Bunzl 2009),
does not pass the consistency check of our model. The common elements that underpin all
conjectures make it almost inevitable that abatement will change as soon as a decision in
favor of SRM is taken since both abatement and SRM address the same problem, but feature
different cost structures. We also fail to find support for the hypothesis that the anticipation
of a large bias among the future generation that favors SRM deployment leads to the current
generation slashing abatement. The reason is that if the current generation cares sufficiently
for the future generation to take abatement action today, then it will also care sufficiently
to take into account the negative side effects of large-scale geoengineering that would result
from slashing abatement.
12An interested reader might again ask how the boundary KBan depends on key model parameter. While
the comparative statics are algebraically messy, we can build on the continuity and monotonicity of the
boundary observed above using a simple trick. This trick involves examining the comparative statics of point
KBanIV (β = 1), i.e. the point at which the boundary coincides with the upper bound on the bias β. By continuity
and monotonicity, the comparative statics of this point are qualititively the same as the comparative statics
of the entire boundary. The comparative statics are that d
dp
KBanIV (β = 1) > 0,
d
dλ¯
KBanIV (β = 1) > 0 and
d
dρ
KBanIV (β = 1) < 0. A greater likelihood or severity of a “climate emergency” increase the relative size of
those zones that involve R&D into SRM while higher SRM damages have the opposite effect.
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On the same grounds that challenge the last two conjectures, the model generates a much
more upbeat view about the link between SRM R&D and abatement in the presence of a bias.
As zone II in Figure 2 illustrates, if the bias is sufficiently weak (β < βcrit), the benchmark
abatement level Aˆ will be maintained in equilibrium. In zone III with βcrit < β ≤ β¯, the bias
is strong enough to render the initial abatement level Aˆ inconsistent with conditional use
by future generation. Anticipating that the technology will be used indiscriminately, current
generation reacts by increasing abatement to the level Acrit(β) at which Dcond and Duncond
merge. The larger the bias β, the larger the necessary increase in abatement in order to
induce the future generation into this specific use of the SRM technology. Finally, in zone
IV (β > β¯), a further increase of β has no additional impact on the abatement level which
remains at Auncond, irrespective of β.
Interestingly, Auncond can be even higher than the technology denial abatement level
ANoR&D. We have
Auncond > ANoR&D if and only if ρ >
2 + 2p(λ¯2 − 1)
2 + p(λ¯2 − 1) . (21)
This is, of course, only meaningful if this condition does not preclude technology provision
equilibria with Θ = 1. We can actually find equilibria in zone IV that feature “overabatement”
relative to ANoR&D.
13 Figure 3 summarizes the abatement level over all equilibria.
Figure 3: Abatement in case of Θ = 1 as a function of the bias β. Whether Auncond is larger
or smaller than the optimal abatement level under no technology provision, ANoR&D, depends
on model parameter.
In addition to this new equilibrium with SRM R&D provision and abatement increases,
Figure 2 captures another consistent conjecture supported by the premises of the model. This
13Even though ρ > 2+2p(λ¯
2−1)
2+p(λ¯2−1) implies that K
Ban
IV (β = 1) < 0 and thus a higher abatement level Auncond >
ANoR&D will not realize for β = 1, there are equilibria with β < 1. Take, for instance, p =
1
10
, λ¯ = 2 and
ρ = 1.15. This leads to Auncond > ANoR&D; at the same time K
Ban
IV (β¯) > 0, implying that the proposed
equilibrium with Θ = 1 and A = Auncond > ANoR&D exists in zone IV.
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is that current society will rationally choose not to engage in SRM R&D activities, i.e. a ban
on SRM R&D is another course of action that our model confirms in a robust fashion (zone
I). This course of action becomes particularly relevant for a large anticipated bias and for
high development costs associated with SRM technologies.
We reserve a final comment on the conjecture that investment in SRM R&D will reduce
abatement and thus give rise to “moral hazard”. As we point out in section 3, comparing
abatement levels under positive and no R&D in the benchmark case shows that abatement in
the presence of SRM R&D is smaller. However, rather than constituting a situation where an
economic party is imposing a risk burden on some other party without proper compensation,
this is an efficient decision that reflects a rational readjustment of its abatement efforts by
the current generation.
In sum, our model is able to successfully replicate three out of the five conjectures reviewed
in the introduction. “Arming the future”, a R&D ban, and abatement reductions relative
to a situation with no SRM R&D all constitute courses of action for current society that
a model capturing the common elements among the conjectures can generate as consistent
conclusions. Two conjectures, one postulating ”abatement invariance” with respect to SRM
R&D decisions and one postulating a drastic abatement reduction by current society, cannot
be replicated and appear inconsistent with the basic premises in the literature. At a minimum,
this means that auxiliary hypotheses and assumptions are necessary in order to demonstrate
the consistency of these conjectures. At a maximum, the conclusion is that these conjectures
are erroneous. In addition to the replication test of five existing conjectures, our model also
shows that the same four common elements that underpin these conjectures give rise to a
novel conjecture: It can be a rational course of action of current society to provide more
abatement the higher the degree of anticipated bias. In fact, it is possible for this optimal
abatement level to even exceed the level that society would rationally provide in the absence
of SRM R&D.
5 Concluding discussion
If feasible, human interventions into the Earth’s climate system would represent a novel
method for future generations to limit the damages of the atmospheric carbon stock that
they will inherit from current society. Such interventions, running under the term of ”geo-
engineering” or ”climate engineering”, would create undesirable side effects of their own,
but could conceivably be considered a realistic option. Solar radiation management (SRM)
technologies are considered one of the likeliest forms of geoengineering to be developed and
deployed.
R&D into SRM raises the possibility of passing on to the next generation not just abate-
ment efforts in the form of a carbon stock that is below business-as-usual. In addition, or
instead, the current generation could pass on a technology that can partially remedy the
damages of excessive atmospheric carbon stocks. Natural scientists, philosophers, ethicists,
and other scholars have started to develop several conjectures on how current society should
decide on the right combination of SRM R&D and abatement efforts. By contrast, economists
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have so far not examined the intergenerational issues implicit in this technological possibil-
ity. This is despite the fact that economics has the potential to contribute substantially to
the discussion thanks to its powerful conceptual tools for the analysis of intergenerational
transfers. It is also despite the fact that the issue of intergenerational technology transfers to
address the intergenerational transfer of stock pollution has so far attracted little attention
in economics, in contrast to other types of intergenerational transfers.
The results of the present paper are a first step towards addressing the intergenerational
issues of SRM R&D in the context of climate change. By developing a simple analytical
model that formalizes several common elements in the wider debate about the correct course
of action for the current generation in this intergenerational game, we harness the powers
of game theoretic analysis for the purpose of understanding more about the problem. The
comparison of the diverse conjectures about the rational course of action to develop SRM
capabilities and the attempts to replicate their logic in a tractable model adds rigor to the
debate and allows distinguishing between consistent conjectures and those that require either
auxiliary hypotheses or correction. The same rigor allows us to identify solutions that have so
far escaped attention, such as our finding that abatement may actually be higher when SRM
capabilities are developed, and challenges loose argumentation, such as the claim regarding
the presence of “moral hazard”.
For the economic debate, this paper represents a starting point for considering more sys-
tematically than before how to integrate the development of technological capabilities into
intergenerational models. This integration is far from complete. It also adds to an emerging
literature that examines the potential role of behavioral factors such as hyperbolic discount-
ing, paternalism, and bounded rationality in the context of interactions across generations.
The context of geoengineering provides a conducive and potentially consequential setting for
more research of this type.
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